Posted on Bluesky and X/Twitter, 22 December 2024.
Even to defence hawks, Trump's demand looks unrealistic. Word is that he will settle for less: 3.5% is the number being talked about. Yet most national governments in Nato are reluctant to spend more than 2% of GDP, the target all members have agreed to. Some countries, like Spain, Italy and Canada, are still far below that level.
The current spending target, ambitious as it may seem to some, is barely enough to finance the status quo. Much larger sums will be needed to improve defence significantly. From a security perspective, the advice is straightforward: Members should pour as much money as possible into their armies, navies and air forces. But could it go wrong?
The yardstick is Nato's ability to defend itself against future Russian aggression. An attack is not certain, of course, but the threat is real. Hedging against it drives up costs to a level reminiscent of the Cold War. Hedging against a US disengagement would cost even more. Effective deterrence would change Putin's calculations and keep the risk of war in check. Given that national governments are dragging their feet, Trump's demand would force Nato allies to deal with the issue instead of wishing it away. So it seems like a win. But.
(Full disclosure: To me, military spending in and of itself is a colossal waste of money. It diverts money from uses which would actually improve society and people's wellbeing, from education to infrastructure. It is a necessary evil, a costly insurance if you will. Still, it needs to rise.)
Rising military spending does not solve the problem of national security – it shifts the emphasis. Given the current financial environment in most of Europe, growing defence budgets are a judgement call, not a guaranteed win: they trade internal stability for external security.
Let's look at some European heavyweights. Budget constraints have been a major factor in the collapse of governments in France and Germany. Italy is subject to the EU's Excessive Deficit Procedure for overspending and forced to tighten its belt. In short, money is tight. Fights about how to spend tax euros have already proved disruptive.
Rising defence expenditure will leave more social issues unaddressed. Fringe parties, many of which are close to Putin, are capitalizing on the rift and attacking democratic institutions. This is likely to get worse. Mainstream parties need to show that they are able to deal with the issues. Money is not the only ingredient, but it plays a major role.
The financial demands are huge. Bureaucracies are still in the process of adapting to the digital age. Ageing populations put a heavy burden on pension schemes. The need to transform economies in the face of climate change is an enormous task, requiring equally massive government incentives. The list goes on. Tighter financial conditions set governments up for failure and delegitimize the mainstream parties which run them.
Contempt for politicians and the system they represent is not just an internal issue Western societies have to deal with. The tension within is also part of the conflict with Putin. He has tried to undermine democracies and EU cohesion long before the war in Ukraine began. His leverage grows with the rifts in the West. Armies can't defend against that sort of attack.
The biggest threat to Europe and Western democracies does not lie beyond the border. It grows on the inside. Defence budgets have to rise to deal with the external threat, but they must be balanced against the need for social cohesion and a functioning society. Defence budgets significantly upwards of 3% of GDP may prove destabilizing and turn into a net loss of security. It will be difficult to figure out the right level of investment, and it will vary by country. But one thing is certain: Focusing on defence too narrowly risks making things worse.