Posted on Bluesky and X/Twitter, 27 March 2025.
There is a low but non-zero probability that Putin might choose to test European defences rather soon. I personally don't think a confrontation is likely this year because Russia will need more time to reconstitute its forces, but worries do exist in some quarters about the Zapad exercise and the troop build-up that goes along with it.
If Putin wants to test the willingness of the alliance to defend its smallest members on its eastern flank, he might decide to do it early. There is a window of opportunity for him before the rearmament of Europe gathers pace and changes the balance of forces.
But another attack on Ukraine is possible, too. Once a ceasefire is in place and Russia gets the chance to rebuild its forces, Putin can pick the time and place for his next move. The defenders won't know where he will attack until Russian preparations can no longer be hidden.
European nations have to choose accordingly and restock their own arsenals first. Moving ammunition to Ukraine doesn't seem wise after the current round of fighting is over. Once supplies are in Ukraine, they won't come back, even if the danger is growing in the Baltics or at the border of Poland. That's why the Europeans in Nato should keep their defence production for themselves and only resume munitions deliveries to Ukraine if another Russian attack seems imminent (but move quickly and decisively then). Continued transfers to Ukraine would increase the risk elsewhere.
At the same time, it makes sense to treat the cooperation with Ukraine as less of a one-way street than it is now. Its army has gathered a lot of experience countering the Russians on the battlefield (and has paid dearly for it). Ukraine has an edge in drone technology, too. It also sits on top of a ton of invaluable training data for battlefield AI, even though that comes with some important caveats.
A lot of support, military and otherwise, has gone to Ukraine. Knowledge should flow the other way. European countries, on their part, have to work on speeding up deliveries to Ukraine in case of another crisis, even as current transfers wind down after a ceasefire. Preparations for the next confrontation with Russia, if and when it happens, should be a joint endeavour by Ukraine and its European partners, in a relationship that is more equal than it is now.
